EXPRESS WARRANTIES IN SALES OF GOODS
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The object of this paper is to discuss the common law cases on express warranties, in connection with the statutory definition of express warranty contained in the Uniform Sales Act."
Nature of warranty and of action for breach. A warranty was originally regarded as a representation, rather than a contract, and an action for breach of warranty was purely a tort action. 2 In early actions in America for breach of warranty trespass on the case was used, 3 and recent cases indicate that the tort theory still clings to the action, 4 although assumpsit or other contract action is now at least an alternative remedy." Certainly, however, the modern tendency is to make more and more of the contract idea and to minimize the tort notion. 6 The Sales Act has nothing to do with forms qf action or procedure for the recovery of damages for breach of warranty, but that a promise or contract is not necessary to a warranty under the Act is shown by the statement that an "affirmation of fact" is a warranty under certain circumstances. The seller need not have made an offer or intended to enter into a contract. It is sufficient that he made a statement of fact which was justifiably relied upon by the buyer. It is frequently said that a warranty is collateral to the main contract of sale ;7 that is, that the warranty runs alongside but forms no part of the agreement to pass the property in goods and p-y the price. At common law the collateral nature of the warranty was important when 'Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12. "Definition of express warranty. Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinlon only shall be construed as a warranty." the question of the survival of the warranty after acceptance of the goods was considered. Many courts held that acceptance of the goods barred all right to claim that the seller had not performed the main sale contract, but did not bar the right to recover for breach of a collateral obligation, namely, a warranty. The collateral nature of the warranty is sometimes of practical importance in other connections." The Sales Act has nothing to say regarding the collateral nature of the warranty obligation and the pre-existing law on that subject will doubtless be continued where the Act is adopted. By providing that all warranties, express and implied, survive acceptance of the goods, 9 the Act might be said to lend force to the opinion that a warranty is a collateral obligation.
There has been some controversy in the common law cases as to whether an express warranty can be an incident of a contract to sell goods, a contract that the property in goods shall pass at a future date. Some cases have held that there can be no warranty, except in connection with a completed or consummated sale, 10 but this must be deemed to .mean that if the obligation of the seller under the main sale contract is subject to a condition precedent which is not performed and so the seller does not have to go on with the contract by delivery and passage of property, there is no liability on his part on any warranty. The obligation on the warranty is subject to the same condition precedent. If the main contract falls to the ground, the collateral contract falls with it. But this does not mean that a seller may not bind himself by a warranty unless the property in the goods is to pass at the time of the making of the sale contract. Other common law cases have appeared to indicate that there can be no warranty regarding the quality of an article not in existence," but this means that the obligation is an "implied condition," or part of the main sale contract, as distinguished from a collateral warranty. The Sales Act calls these common law "implied conditions," warranties. 2 Where the point has been squarely presented whether a warranty can arise only if the parties intended to pass property at once, 'Thus in Wills v. Wright (191I, Del. Super. Ct) 8I Atl. 507, an action for breach of warranty was brought in the court of a Justice of the Peace. That court had jurisdiction over contracts to deliver goods and pay money, but it was held that it had no jurisdiction over the collateral obligation, the warranty. In Sanderson v. Trump Mfg. Co. (913) i8o Ind. 197, lo2 N. E. 2, it was held that the seller might recover the price without introducing evidence regarding the warranty, the burden of proving the existence and falsity of the warranty being on the buyer.
'See Uniform Sales Act, sec. 49. " Osborn v. Gantz (1875) to N. Y. 540; Levis v. Pope Motor Car Co. (igii) .202N. Y. 402, 95 N. E. 815 (semble; here the sale was subject to a condition subsequent, and it was held that an express warranty might be an incident of such a sale).
'Potonac Steamboat Co. v. Harlan (1886) the courts have held that a warranty and an agreement to pass property in the future are not inconsistent. 13 It is ordinarily held that privity of contract is necessary to an obligation on a warranty, 14 that such obligation can exist only between seller and buyer, and that the seller's liability for breach of warranty does not extend to remote buyers of the goods; that is, does not run with the goods. 15 There are, however, cases where the seller of goods has been held liable to another than the buyer because of breach of the warranty which was given to the buyer,' 8 and also a few cases where other persons than the seller have been held liable to the buyer for breach of warranty on the basis of statements or promises regarding the goods. If another than the seller guarantees, for a consideration, that the goods shall possess certain qualities, he has doubtless made a valid contract, but it is not technically a warranty. It would seem to be unsound to hold such third person for mere affirmations of fact about the goods. If an agent of the seller or a bystander desires to undertake on his own behalf to guarantee the quality of the goods, there is no reason why he may not do so, but the elements of true contract should be present. The Sales Act, in this section and throughout, indicates that the term "warranty" is to be reserved for an obligation from seller to buyer. The contracts of third parties about the goods are not true warranties and warranties do not run under the Act to remote vendees.
It is elementary that scienter is not necessary to an obligation to respond for breach of warranty. The buyer does not need to prove that the seller knew that his statements about the goods were false or that his promises regarding their quality or capacity would not be fulfilled. The state of the seller's knowledge regarding the facts affirmed or the promises made is immaterial.' 9 If the seller did actually know that the statements he made about the goods were untrue, the buyer may elect between deceit and breach of warranty. Form of warranty; words necessary. While in the early law the use of the word "warrant" was necessary, and the allegation had to be warrantizando vendidit, 2 this formality has long since been dispensed with, and it is universally held that no particular words or phrases are necessary to constitute a warranty. 22 The use of the word "warrant," without reference to any particular qualities, is equivalent to an assertion of general soundness.23 Sometimes the word "guaranty" is used in the sense of "warranty ;,,24 but this is a loose use of the former word, for it properly applies only to "an assurance of the payment of a debt or the performance of a duty or contract by another person." 25 Consideration: time of warranty. The contract nature of the warranty obligation is shown by the requirement that there be consideration for the warranty. If the warranty is made at the time of the sale, the agreement to pay, or payment of, the price is sufficient consideration, 26 and no separate consideration for the warranty need be agreed upon .
2
If the statements of the seller were made previous to the sale, it is a question for the trier of facts to determine whether the statements were justifiably relied on by the buyer at the time of the making of the sale contract or whether they were mere preliminary representations which were set aside and superseded by.what was said and done at the time the parties entered into the contract. I4W Minn. 423, 17o N. W. 513; Blair v. Hall (1918, Mo. App.) 2Q1 S. W. 945. But if the buyer alleges fraud and breach of warranty in the same complaint and proves the latter only, it has been held that he cannot recover, since the gravamen of his action was fraud. Ross v. Mather (1872) prior to the formation of the contract have been regarded as warranties, 29 while in other cases it has been held that the contract was not made with reference to such statements." 0 Where the prior statements of the seller are regarded as warranties, the assumption is that there is an implied repetition of them at the time of the making of the contract and that the buyer's payment of, or agreement to pay, the price forms the consideration for the warranties.
If the statement relied on by the buyer as evidence of a warranty was made after the making of the sale contract, proof must be made of some new consideration, aside from the payment of, or agreement to pay, the price. 31 Such new consideration has been found where the buyer paid the price before due, 32 or accepted the goods after the failure of the seller to deliver on time. 33 If the warranty was made after the sale, but in compliance with an understanding reached at the time of the making of the contract, it has been held to relate back to the date of the contract, and to be supported by the consideration of the main contract.
34
It would seem that mere acceptance of the goods, an act which the buyer was under an obligation to perform, ought not to constitute sufficient consideration for a warranty made after the formation of the contract but before delivery, 5 but there is som& authority to the contrary. If what is alleged to be a warranty is in writing, the construction of it is for the court.,, Where the evidence is oral, the existence of a warranty is for the jury, s 9 unless reasonable men could draw but one deduction.
40
The buyer has the burden of showing a warranty and its breach.
1
The parol evidence rule of course applies to contracts of sale as well as other documents. Hence where a paper purports to contain all the terms of the contract of sale, parol evidence will not be admitted to show an express warranty, 42 and, in the absence of fraud or mistake, a contract containing written warranties will be conclusively presumed to contain all the express warranties made in connection with the sale.
"
But where the paper is a mere memorandum or partial statement of the contract, oral evidence will be received to show a warranty. form of a promise, warranty or guaranty has not been insisted upon. The difficulty has been to decide whether a given statement was an affirmation of fact or mere seller's talk or expression of opinion. In solving this question the courts have considered the amount of knowledge possessed by both parties concerning the goods, the character of the goods, and many other points. Cases illustrating the kind of statements regarded by the courts as affirmations of fact are cited below.
5
The affirmation must be to the buyer. A statement to a third party is not admissible. 46 And the affirmation must be definite. 
Is descriptive matter an express warranty?
The seller may execute and deliver a bill of sale by which he passes property in "one sound, gentle six year old horse," or he may orally agree upon the sale of a horse before the eyes of the parties and state during the negotiations that the horse is sound, gentle and six years old. Is there any difference between the obligations incurred by the seller in these two cases? Are the engagements of the seller to be called by different names? In one the statements about the age and qualities of the horse form a part of the description of the subject-matter of the contract, in the other transaction the horse is identified by the observation of the parties and the affirmations Qbout quality and age are separate and collateral.
The majority of the courts which have considered the effect of statements about the quality of goods, embodied in the description of the subject-matter, held at common law that such statements were not express warranties because they were not collateral to the sale contract, but were rather a part of the main agreement to transfer the property in goods and pay a price in exchange therefor . 4 That the goods be as described was an "implied condition," 4 9 but it was not an express warranty. The Sales Act 5 " deduces from the description a warranty that the goods shall conform to the description, an obligation which takes the place of the common law "implied condition" that the goods conform. But in many cases descriptive statements, part and parcel of the statement of what the subject-matter was, have been held to amount to express warranties. (3) Statements of fact made by the seller on subjects other than the title, quality, identity, or capacity of the goods, as, for example, concerning the ability of the seller to deliver the goods at a certain time. These latter statements if made preliminarily, and not as a part of the contract, are "representations," and may of course be false or innocent. 5 4 (4) Implied warranties, obligations which the law deems the seller to have undertaken implicitly, although they were not directly stated, 55 are of course to be distinguished from express warranties, even though under the Sales Act their effect is identical. 56 Under the common law they often produced different results.
57
(5) The right to inspect and reject or accept is not the right to hold the seller liable for a defect in quality, and so not an express warranty. It is not a promise that the goods will be such that the buyer should accept them.
58 (6) Where there is a sale on approval there is no express warranty. The buyer has a right to test the goods and decide whether they suit him, but the seller does not agree that they will suit the buyer.
59
Warranty may consist of a promise. Although in the early common law it was contended that a warranty must be a statement of a fact or a warranty that a fact was true, and could not consist of a promise that an event would come to pass or that the goods would possess certain Pac. 62, a statement that hogs were sound, made in advance of the making of the contract, and for the purpose of inducing the buyer to buy, was said to be a mere representation and not a warranty, because it was not a part of the contract, but was merely made to induce the contract. This seems unsound.
'Uniform Sales Act, secs. Thus, where goods are being sold on the basis of original cost, a statement 'nade by the seller that the marks on the goods show the original cost is not a warranty but rather a representation."' It was a statement which undoubtedly tended to induce the sale, but it did not relate to identity, quality or title of the goods. It had to do with the price which the seller had originally paid for the goods.
There may be in connection with a sale contract a promise on the part of the seller to perform some act regarding the goods, as for example, to overhaul an automobile after a trip, 9 or to take back the goods, under certain circumstances.70 These are not warranties, but rather special and additional contracts made at the same time as the sale contract. They do not relate to the character, quality or title of the goods, but to some act which the seller agrees to perform with respect to the goods.
In some states there existed, prior to the Sales Act, a statutory definition of express warranty apparently broader than that of the Act." It read: "A warranty is an engagement by which a seller assures to a buyer the existence of some fact affecting the transaction, whether past, present or future." According to this definition the affirmation or promise need not necessarily refer to the quality or title of the goods, but might relate to the financial standing of the seller or the output of his factory.
Although the law of warranty in the field of sales properly applies only to goods, similar principles have been followed in treating transfers of incorporeal personal property, as, for example, notes, 7 2 accounts," and judgments.
74
Natural tendency to induce purchase: intent. The instruction of juries concerning the state of mind which the seller must have possessed when he made a statement, if such affirmation is to be regarded as a warranty, has caused the courts much trouble. Some courts have held that the seller must have intended to warrant, must have made an offer to bind himself for the truth of his assertion, and that unless he agreed expressly and actually to respond in damages if his statement proved " Ruff v. Jarrett, supra note 44; Reval v. Miller (1913) The views of the courts in this class of cases are illustrated by a statement from an opinion of Kent, as follows: "To make an affirmation at the time of a sale, a warranty, it must appear by evidence to be so intended, and not to have been a mere matter of judgment and opinion." 79 In still other decisions the courts have stated the requirement to be that the seller intend to state a fact and not merely to give an opinion.
0
In yet other cases it has been said that the seller must have intended to induce the sale by his statement, 8 ' or must have made his affirmation with the intent that the buyer rely upon it in making the purchase. 
807, 808
("This is but the statement of the general rule that in order to make a contract the minds of the parties must agree upon the same thing, the intention or belief of one only not being sufficient for the purpose. The intention of both must be the same") ; see also Tomlinson & Co. v. Morgan (1914) a number of cases in which it is denied that the seller's intent is germane. The important question is, say the courts in these decisions, What was the buyer justified in believing? That this statement was mere chaffing -or personal opinion, or that it was put forward as an assertion of fact which the buyer might depend upon in promising to take title and pay the price ?8 Earle, C., in Hawkins v. Pemberton 4 stated the case as follows: "It is not true, as sometimes stated, that the representation, in order to constitute a warranty, must have been intended by the vendor, as well as understood by the vendee, as a warranty. If the contract be in writing and it contains a clear warranty, the vendor will not be permitted to say that he did not intend what his language clearly and explicitly declares; and so if it be by parol, and the representation as to the character or quality of the article sold be positive, not mere matter of opinion or judgment, and the vendee understand it as a warranty and he relies upon it and is induced by it, the vendor is bound by the warranty, no matter whether he intended it to be a warranty or not. He is responsible for the language he uses, and cannot escape liability by claiming that he did not intend to convey the impression which his language was calculated to produce upon the mind of the vendee."
The Sales Act adopts the view put forth in these latter cases and stresses the natural tendency of the seller's statements, and the actual .Every man is presumed to intend the consequences of his own act. When, therefore, a vendor in negotiating a sale makes an affirmation of quality as an assurance of fact which is relied on by the buyer it constitutes a warranty, for the vendor will be presumed to have so intended") ; Huntington v. Lombard, supra note 61; Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Callendar (1904) 36 Wash. 492, 79 Pac. 30; Smith v. Justice, supra note 45, at p. 603 ("It is true, the question to be arrived at in construing every agreement is the intention of the parties. But each party is bound by such intention as his language in making the agreement indicates. And he cannot use language there showing one intention, and then avoid its effect by leaving to the jury the question whether he really intended it or not").
8
"Supra note 63, at p. 202. Accord: Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, supra note 5i; Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co. v. Schwartzchild (19io, App. Term.) 121 N. Y. Supp. 292. effect on the buyer. Both natural tendency and actual effect must exist. Even if the seller's statement would lead an ordinary man into reliance in making the purchase, the statement is not a warranty, unless the buyer in question actually relied. And actual reliance by this particular buyer on what the seller said will not make the affirmation a warranty, unless the natural tendency of the statement in question was to lead the buyer into the purchase. The buyer may have been unreasonable in his conduct and foolishly trusted to a mere puff as an assurance of the quality of the goods.
In cases where the seller's intent has been stressed there are some discussions regarding the evidence necessary to show that the seller had the requisite intent. The use of the word "warrant" by the seller has been held sufficient proof of an intent to warrant." 5 An affirmation regarding the title to goods has been held to be conclusively presumed to be intended as a statement of fact and not an opinion. 6 Where the buyer states the purpose for which he is buying the article and the seller then makes a remark regarding the fitness of the article for that purpose, intent to warrant has been found, 7 especially if there is no opportunity for inspection and the seller has personal knowledge about the goods and the buyer has no knowledge.
88
If the seller strikes out the warranty clause from a bill of sale, it is of course strong evidence of an intent not to warrant.
89 Even in the common law cases which required that the seller intend to warrant, it has been said occasionally that presumed or constructive intent to warrant was enough. "If a party uses language which imports a warranty, the presumption is that he intends it as such." Purchase of goods in reliance on warranty. The common-law cases lay down the rule that, in order to obligate the seller, there must be reliance by the buyer on the warranty. 0 ' If the buyer relied wholly on 'Davis v. Berkheimer (1911) his own judgment or that of someone else than the seller, then the buyer can scarcely be said to have paid or agreed to pay for the seller's warranty of the quality or title, and there cannot be said to have been a contract that the seller would respond in damages if the goods failed in quality or title.
But it is not necessary that the warranty of the seller was the sole inducement to the purchase, or that the buyer trusted entirely to the seller's warranty in taking the goods. The buyer may have inspected as well as he could and formed an opinion and relied partly on his own judgment and partly on the affirmation of the seller.
2
Reliance should be pleaded by the buyer who sets up a warranty, 9 3 but it has been said that its existence will be presumed where the warranty is part of the contract of sale. 4 The buyer may testify directly that he relied on the seller's statement as a warranty, 95 but this is not necessary; the jury-may find reliance from all the facts of the case, without testimony of the buyer that he relied. 96 An important fact in determining reliance is the amount of knowledge regarding the goods possessed by both parties.9 7 If the buyer knows as much of the goods as does the seller, and the buyer does not testify that he relied on the seller's statements, the jury will be justified in finding no reliance.
9 8
That the goods were second-hand, and therefore might be expected to be somewhat worn or defective, does not necessarily show that there was no reliance by the buyer. was held that if the warranty is in express terms, it is not necessary to show reliance. 'Keely v. Turbeville (1883, Tenn.) ii Lea, 339. "Feeney & Bremer Co. v. Stone (1918) Williams v. Ingle, supra note 61, it was held that if the warranty was a promise regarding the future condition of the goods, and not the statement of a present fact, reliance need not be pleaded. This seems unsound.
" Merkle-Hines Mach. Co. v. Gaynor, supra note 45. ' Milwaukee-Rice Mach. Co. v. Hamacek, supra note 45. "Smith v. Hale, supra note 61; Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. McKinnon (1goo) 82 Minn. 75, 84 N. W. 646. "Schmidt v. Jutting (1913) his own knowledge that the goods are sound ;"o2 or investigates for himself ;"o" or tests a horse himself and employs a veterinarian to do likewise.
04
Inspection or opportunity for inspection: reliance. If the buyer receives a warranty of the title or quality of the goods he is under no duty to inspect the goods or make an investigation regarding them, for the purpose of finding out whether the warranty is true or false.
10 5
One of the objects of taking the warranty is to save the buyer the trouble of making such inspection or investigation and the risk of relying wholly upon the information thus obtained. The seller is not relieved from his warranty because the buyer might, by diligent search, have discovered that the warranty was false and ought not to be relied upon.
Neither the oplportunity for inspection, 0 6 nor actual inspection,' 1 0 7 necessarily shows that the buyer did not rely in part or wholly'on the seller's statements; but of course, as previously indicated, an inspection by the buyer, especially if he be a competent judge of the goods, is evidence tending to show lack of reliance.
09
Defect visible: reliance. A "visible defect" in the law of express warranties means one which would be observed by an ordinary observer, possessing no particular skill, and therefore presuxmed to have come to the attention of the buyer; or a defect which was shown actually to have come to the notice of the buyer before the making of the contract, no matter how easy or difficult to detect it might be. 109 A defect is not (191o) 33 Ohio C. C. 232, a defect discovered after delivery and the passage of property and the giving of the warranty seems to have been regarded as a "visible defect," so as to prevent the buyer from recovering damages for injuries sustained in using the goods after such discovery. This seems erroneous. The time of the making of the contract determines the visibility of the defect.
visible if an unusual process of investigation is necessary to discover it, as, for example, the stripping of a slave. 110 Nor is the defect visible where the seller creates conditions which render it impossible to observe the defect, as where the seller keeps the horse in a dark stable, with his ankles buried in straw."
It is a well known common law doctrine in the law of warranty that a general warranty does not cover obvious defects.
112 If the seller states that the horse is sound, and both parties have observed and talked about the blindness of the horse in one eye, the law assumes that they intended to make an exception of this known defect, and that the warranty meant sound, except for the blindness in one eye. It is a natural and reasonable conclusion that the buyer did not rely on this general warranty as a statement by the seller that the horse had two good eyes, but rather consented to take the horse with the defective eye and with a corresponding deduction in the purchase price. If, however, a quality or condition of the goods is noted, the effect or nature of which is uncertain, a general warranty of soundness will cover this condition.
11 2 Here it is not known whether the characteristic is a defect of a permanent character or not, and thus there is a reliance by the buyer and the natural tendency of the statement is to induce a purchase. Thus, where blemishes of an uncertain nature hre observed by the parties on the legs of a horse, a general warranty will protect the buyer.' 1 4 In the last cited case the court said :-15 "The rule excluding from a warranty such defects as are known to the purchaser, only applies to such as are perfectly obvious to the senses, and the effects and consequences of which may be accurately estimated, so that no purchaser would expect the seller to warrant against them."
If the seller gives a particular warranty against some specific defect, obviously the buyer has no protection (unless by implied warranty) against another particular defect, whether known or unknown. Thus, if a seller warrants a horse as good for driving, but states that she will not stand hitched, the latter specific defect is not covered by the particular warranty given." 6 If the goods have a known defect, the seller may specifically warrant the goods against the effects of this defect, and this particular warranty will of course give the buyer a cause of action if the defect proves different from that guaranteed.
7
Thus, if a buyer observes a puff on a horse's leg and the seller assures him that it is a temporary condition and will soon disappear, there is a warranty against serious, permanent weakness of the leg and such warranty is broken when the horse is proved to have a spavin." 8 1
Here very clearly the buyer relies on the seller's statement that an uncertain or equivocal condition will not be detrimental to the goods. The seller's engagement is practically that the observed condition is not a defect.
Affirmations of value. The Sales Act provides that affirmations of value shall, as a matter of law, be regarded as expressions of opinion only and not as warranties. This seems to be out of accord with the common law rule, which was that statements regarding the value of the goods sold might be warranties, and that it was for the trier of facts to determine whether the buyer justifiably relied on the statement as one of fact. In some cases the jury or court found that the assertion about how much the goods were worth was meant and understood as an expression of opinion only," 9 while in other cases the buyer was held to have been justified in believing that the seller was asserting a fact on which, the buyer might rely in making the purchase and hence that the statement was a warranty. matter of personal judgment about which one party can form an opinion as well as the other; but, on the other hand, the facts which give the goods value may be peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller so that his assertions regarding value may well be relied on by the buyer. But such assertions do not relate to the character, quality or title of the goods. They relate to the price which could be obtained on a resale, or the benefit which will be derived from the goods if consumed or used. For this latter reason they might reasonably be regarded as representations, and not as warranties, if they were in fact anything more than expressions of opinion, guesses, or dealer's talk. Puffs ad opinions. Two classes of statements are clearly not warranties, either at common law or under the Act. The first of these classes consists of that vague, enticing chatter indulged in by some salesmen in order to get the prospective buyer into a purchasing frame of mind. The buyer is told that the goods are "the best in the market," "the finest thing there is for the money," "the greatest bargain I have offered in months," and so forth. These statements are patently not assertions of facts, or even expressions of opinion, but merely "puffs" or "dealer's talk." No one would be justified in relying on them as having any legal effect, and the common law cases treat them as of no consequence.
1
The second class of statements which do not bind the seller or make him a guarantor of their truth are opinions. If the trier of facts finds that the assertion in question was given and understood, or was given and should have been understood, as an expression of the seller's judgment or opinion only, it will necessarily find that there was no warranty and no responsibility by the seller for the falsity of judgment or opinion. There are numerous examples among the common law cases of holdings that statements of opinion by the seller are not warrantiesY. Mfg. Co. (19o7) 196 Mass. 257,  8r N. E. 993, the fact that the automobile sold was disposed of at half the price of a new car was given weight in leading the court to the conclusion that the seller's statement that the machine was in "first class condition" was one of The Sales Act states the common law rule regarding opinions, but makes no mention of "dealer's talk," either upon the theory that its lack of legal effect is too obvious for mention, or because "puffs" are regarded as the weakest form of opinions and so covered by the rule regarding opinions. 
